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Abstract 
 
This paper presents a synopsis of the major developments in corporate governance regulations 
and recommendations for Australian audit committees categorised into three distinct periods of 
regulation from 1976-2004.  Prior Australian empirical research conducted on audit committee 
formation, audit committee member composition and audit committee diligence is summarised 
and compared. The research is then extended by presenting the results of an empirical study of 
188 of the top 300 ASX listed companies with a financial year end of 30th June 2004, which is the 
first year of the third period of regulation. The results indicate that compliance with corporate 
governance regulations and recommendations has improved substantially with respect to: audit 
committee formation; the number of audit committee members, non-executive directors on the 
audit committee; financial expertise of audit committee members and the frequency of audit 
committee meetings. However, the number of independent directors on audit committees was 
well below ASX CGC best practice guidelines. 
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1.0 Introduction  
 
Over the past two decades, audit committees (hereafter ACs) have become an important 
mechanism for strengthening the corporate governance structures of publicly listed companies 
worldwide.  As a result of the spate of high profile corporate collapses overseas and within 
Australia, for example, Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, HIH Insurance, OneTel and Harris Scarfe, 
the pressure to strengthen corporate governance regulations has intensified.  In response, 
legislators in several countries have introduced corporate governance law reforms with the aim of 
improving corporate accountability and restoring shareholder confidence in financial reporting 
practicesii.  
 
ACs are commonly viewed as monitoring mechanisms that enhance the audit attestation 
function of external financial reporting and external auditor independence by establishing a 
formal communication link between the board of directors, the internal monitoring system 
and the internal and external auditors (Bradbury 1990, Blue Ribbon Committee 1999).  The 
primary objective of an AC is to "increase the credibility of annual financial statements, assist 
directors in meeting their responsibilities and enhance audit independence", Bradbury 
(1990:21). ACs have also been described as a mechanism for monitoring and protecting the 
interests of shareholders (Harrison 1987, English 1994, Menon and Williams 1994, De Zoort, 
Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed 2002, Gendron and Bedard 2006), while the view of 
Kolins, Cangemi and Tomasko (1991) is, that financial reporting is more reliable and 
questionable corporate practices are reduced if an AC exists. Other authors have similar views 
on the role of AC’s (see for example, Eichenseher and Shields 1985, DeZoort 1998, Carcello 
and Neal 2000). 
                     
ii For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 in the US, the Combined Code on Corporate Governance 2003 in the UK and the Audit Reform 
& Corporate Disclosure Act 2004 in Australia. 
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The gradual strengthening of corporate governance structures advocating the establishment of 
ACs and their roles and responsibilities, provide the impetus for this paper. Australia, along with 
other countries, has moved forward from the simple disclosure-based approach to corporate 
governance to an established comprehensive ‘framework of corporate governance’ through the 
Corporations Act (2001)(Cth) (Commonwealth of Australia 2001), the implementation of the 
Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (hereafter CLERP)iii and the active involvement of 
the Australian Stock Exchange (hereafter ASX), which has issued corporate governance listing 
rules and best practice recommendations (ASX CGC 2003, 2007). The overall objective of this 
paper is to encapsulate the development and level of adoption of AC regulation and 
recommendations for ASX listed companies in Australia. 
 
The aim of this paper is threefold.  First, the paper presents a synopsis of the key developments in 
corporate governance regulations and recommendations for Australian ACs categorised into three 
distinct time periods of regulation from 1976-2004.  The periods are distinguished by the  
changes in regulations and are categorised into the following: (1) voluntary AC formation & non-
disclosure, 1976 – 1st July 1993; (2) voluntary AC formation & public disclosure, 1st July 1993 – 
1st January 2003; and (3) mandatory AC formation & public disclosure, 1st January 2003 
onwards. The key developments affecting Australian ACs over these periods have been 
summarised in a timeline diagram, (see Diagram 1).  The diagram demonstrates the unique 
characteristics of the Australian AC history and provides researchers, policy setters, and 
practitioners, with a quick and easy reference to the history of AC regulation in Australia.  
 
Insert Diagram I Here 
                     
iii CLERP 9 was the result of a Government discussion paper proposing improvements to audit regulation and corporate governance practices 
for Australian companies, which was incorporated into the overall CLERP (Commonwealth of Australia 2002, Commonwealth of Australia 
2004). 
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Second, prior Australian empirical research conducted on the level of AC formation, AC member 
composition and AC meeting frequency is summarised and compared.  Although AC formation 
was not mandatory until 1st January 2003, many boards of Australian publicly listed companies 
had increasingly established ACs and were introducing the ASX recommended best practice 
guidelines for ACs in response to imminent changes in AC regulations and the call for increased 
corporate governance practices. 
 
Third, this paper extends prior research by presenting the results of an empirical study of 188 of 
the top 300 ASX listed companies, i.e. with a financial year end of 30 June, 2004. The remaining 
companies without a financial year ending June 30, 2004 were eliminated from the sample.  This 
is the first full year of the third period of regulation.  This period of regulation is the most 
significant in Australia to date, because for the first time AC formation is mandatory together 
with the requirement to disclose more detailed information in relation to the composition and 
operation of the AC.  This study collects data on compliance with ASX Listing Rule 12.7, which 
mandates the formation of an AC for the top 300 ASX listed companies (ASX 2006). In addition, 
evidence is collected on adherence with best practice recommendations set by the ASX Corporate 
Governance Council (hereafter ASX CGC) in relation to AC composition, including the number 
of members, their independence, financial expertise and the frequency of AC meetings.  This data 
captures, for the first time, the level of compliance with mandatory provisions and provides a 
base from which future research can be compared. 
 
The findings of this study indicate that for the first year of the third period of regulation, 
compliance with corporate governance regulation and best practice recommendations has 
improved for the top 300 ASX listed companies in the areas of AC formation, the number of 
AC members, non-executive directors serving on the AC, the financial expertise of AC 
members and the frequency of meetings.  However, on the issue of AC member independence 
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compliance is well below what is recommended in the best practice guidelines.  This could be 
due to a lack of disclosure, confusion over the definition on ‘independence’ or a reluctance on 
behalf of company boards to appoint independent AC members. 
 
The results are important as they indicate good corporate governance practices are increasing, 
when compared with the prior Australian studies. Overall, the impact of AC regulation and 
recommendations are effective in improving corporate governance structures and practices 
within the top 300 ASX listed companies. 
 
This paper is structured as follows.  The following section gives a brief overview of AC 
regulation, followed by an explanation and diagram of the three key developmental stages in 
AC regulation in Australia. The third section discusses the prior literature, then summarises 
and tabulates prior empirical research.  Section four explains the regulatory changes from 1 
July 2003.  In addition, our current study conducted for the first years of these changes is 
described and the results are presented.  The final section summaries the research on the 
adoption of AC regulation and recommendations over the last thirty years and suggests 
opportunities for future research. 
 
2.0 Overview of Audit Committee Regulation 
 
The collapse of Enron in the United States became the catalyst for the Public Company Reform 
and Investor Protection Act 2002, known as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (hereafter SOX 2002), 
which prescribes standards and responsibilities of corporate governance (United States Congress 
2002).  Following the issuing of SOX (2002) and the collapse of HIH Insurance in Australia, the 
federal government issued the  ‘CLERP 9 Bill’ which  became law on 1 July 2004 and is known 
as the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & Corporate Disclosure) Act 
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2004, which enabled amendments to the Corporations Act 2001(Cth) (Commonwealth of 
Australia 2001).   
 
Currently the formation, composition and operations of ACs in Australia are governed by ASX  
listing rules and ASX CGC best practice recommendations.  Similar to the United Kingdom 
reformsiv, Australia has predominantly adopted a ‘principles based’ approach rather than the 
more ‘prescriptive’ approach adopted under SOX (2002). Instead of directly mandating audit 
committee regulations through the Corporations Act 2001, this has been accomplished through 
the ASX which has played a more active role since 2002.  ASX Listing Rules are contractually 
binding on ASX listed companies and are enforceable under sections 793C and 1101B of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)(Commonwealth of Australia 2001). 
 
The ASX CGC was established in 2002 to design and implement guidelines to improve the 
efficiency, quality and integrity of corporate governance practices and presentation of the 
company’s financial position.  This body released Corporate Governance Principles and 
Recommendations in 2003 and a revised edition in 2007 (ASX CGC 2003, ASX CGC 2007). 
 The ASX CGC (2007) defines corporate governance as “the framework of rules, 
relationships, systems and processes within and by which authority is exercised and 
controlled in corporations”.  “It encompasses the mechanisms by which companies and those 
in control are held to account” (ASX CGC 2007:3).  “Effective corporate governance 
structures encourage companies to create value (through entrepreneurism, innovation, 
development and exploration) and provide accountability and control systems commensurate 
with the risks involved” ASX CGC (2007:3).  In conjunction with independent, competent 
Boards of Directors, ACs are vitally important mechanisms of good corporate governance 
                     
iv The Financial Reporting Council issued the Combined Code on Corporate Governance in 2003 which was updated in 2006. Under the 
code companies listed in the U.K. should establish an AC consisting of at least three non-executive independent directors, with at least one 
member having recent and relevant financial experience (Financial Reporting Council – United Kingdom 2003, Financial Reporting Council 
– United Kingdom 2006, s3.1). 
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(Chen, Moroney and Houghton 2005) and are “a more efficient mechanism than the full board 
for focusing the company on particular issues relevant to verifying and safeguarding the 
integrity of the company’s financial reporting” (ASX CGC 2003:29). 
 
2.1 Stages in Audit Committee Regulation Development in Australia (1976-2007)  
 
Historically, Australian regulators had adopted a disclosure-based approach to corporate 
governance which did not require adherence to any regulations or best practices. However, 
during the past twenty years there have been a number of recommendations from regulatory and 
professional bodiesv seeking mandatory AC establishment.  In addition key AC characteristics 
and the implementation of essential corporate governance principles and practice 
recommendations for ASX listed companies have been proposed.  
 
The development of AC regulation in Australia can be classified into three distinct time periods. 
The first period from 1976 -1st July 1993 (Period 1-Voluntary AC Formation & Non Disclosure) 
represents the period in which Australian listed companies were not required to form ACs but 
were encouraged to do so by the ASX, professional accounting firms, and government 
committees.  This was also the period in which listed companies were not required to publicly 
disclose in their annual reports whether they had an AC but were required to disclose to the ASX 
in their company annual returnsvi whether they had voluntarily formed an AC (ASX 1993).  
 
The second period from 1st July 1993-1st January 2003 (Period 2-Voluntary AC Formation &  
Public Disclosure) was a period in which listed companies were still not required to form an AC  
                     
    v Australian Stock Exchange (1992); Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1989);  KPMG (1990); House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1992); Corporate Practices and Conduct Papers (Business Council of 
Australia 1991, 1993, 1995); The Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia (1993), ASX Corporate Governance Council (2003). 
vi  A company annual return form was required to be submitted to the ASX providing corporate disclosure details which were not publicly 
available at this time.  This needs to be distinguished from a publicly available annual report. 
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but a large percentage of companies voluntarily did so. During this period, companies were 
required by the ASX to publicly disclose in their annual reports whether they had an AC.  Those  
without an AC were required to explain why an AC was unnecessary to the governance of their 
organisation.  Listed companies were also required by the ASX to disclose in their annual report 
the main corporate governance practices employed by the entity during the reporting period 
(ASX 2001).  
 
The third period from 1st January 2003 to the present (Period 3-Mandatory AC Formation & 
Public Disclosure) is the period in which the top 300 listed companies in Australia are required 
by the ASX to have an AC and must disclose further information on their corporate governance 
practices in their annual report.  Listed companies in this period must disclose whether they are 
complying with the ASX CGC guidelines or not and explain why they are not applying all these 
guidelines.  However, some transitional arrangements apply until 1 July 2005 (ASX 2001, ASX 
2006), but these have a limited effect on this study and are explained fully in section four. 
 
3.0 Prior literature  
 
The Treadway Commission in the U.S. considered that ACs play a critical role in ensuring the 
integrity of the company's financial reporting and that all public companies should have ACs 
comprised entirely of independent directors (National Commission on Fraudulent Financial 
Reporting 1987). A number of AC characteristics have also been identified as important in the 
prior literature in an attempt to measure AC effectiveness.  These include AC member 
independence, audit committee numbers, the financial expertise and knowledge of AC 
members and the frequency of AC meetings, (Abbott and Parker 2000, Carcello and Neal 
2000, Carcello and Neal 2003, De Zoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed 2002).   Each 
of these, are discussed below. 
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3.1 Audit Committee Formation 
The formation of ACs in Australia has been steadily increasing since they were first 
documented in listed companies in the early 1970's (Porter and Gendall 1993).  The prior 
literature is extensive and a summary of empirical evidence from Australian studies on the 
frequency of AC formation over the three time periods of regulation is presented in Table I. 
 
Table I shows that during Period 1 (1977-1993), the proportion of companies with an AC ranged 
between 25% and 91%.  In Period 2 (1993-2001), the range is between 83.0% and 95.6%, with 
the lowest level of AC formation reported at 76.6% in 2000 and the highest at 100% (68 of the 
Top 100) in 1996. We acknowledge that the samples referred to in the first two periods are not 
comparable but these results provide evidence of a substantial increase in AC formation during 
these time periods even though it was still voluntary.  In the third regulation period, the rate of 
AC formation appears to have risen towards full establishment.  KPMG (2005) found that all 55 
entities they surveyed in the Top 500 ASX listed companies had an AC in 2003 and 2004. 
Although there is some variability in the results over the three periodsvii, overall, the results of 
prior studies provide strong evidence of the impact of corporate governance recommendations 
and ASX listing rules on the increase in AC formation over the three periods of regulation.  
 
Insert Table I Here 
 
3.2  Number of Audit Committee Members 
 
There is limited prior research on AC member numbers in periods 1 and 2 therefore, we have 
not included a comparative table.  However, the research in period 1 does relate to large listed 
companies and it therefore worth reporting.  
 
                     
vii
 The variability is probably due to the reliability of data collection, i.e. survey versus financial report and the size of the sample. 
  
10 
Christofi (1978), from a small sample of 33 large listed public companies, identified that ACs 
had between 2-6 members and an average of 3 members.  Davison (1984) found that ACs 
generally had between 4-5 members as did Ernst and Young (1991), who also identified that  
ACs ranged in size from 2 to 9.  From a larger sample of 106 ASX listed companies, Arthur 
Andersen (1992) identified that 87% of respondents had an AC of 3-5 members whilst 10% 
had only 2 members.  Only 3% of this sample had an AC in the 6-10 member range.  Korn 
Ferry in their survey of the top 300 ASX listed companies in 1992 and 1993 found that ACs 
had on average 4 members, three being non-executives and 1 executive (Korn Ferry 1993, 
Korn Ferry 1994).  Buckby (1994) also found that 70% of ACs in 1993 belonging to the top 
500 companies listed on the ASX, had 3-4 members, whilst 10% had 2 members, and 20% 
had 5 or more members.  It is clear from these results that companies were unsure just how 
many members ‘ideally’ should be on the AC with a range of 2-10 and an average of between 
4-5 members. 
 
 
3.3 Audit Committee Member Independence 
 
The independence of AC members is seen as the most important characteristic in ensuring 
that ACs fulfil their primary obligation of making judgements that are in the best interests of a 
company’s shareholders. Many papers have discussed AC member independence and its 
relationship to AC effectiveness (for example see Buckby 1994, Ramsay and Hoad 1997, Blue 
Ribbon Committee 1999, Goodwin and Yeo 2001, De Zoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and 
Reed 2002, ASX CGC 2003, ASX CGC 2007). 
 
A number of researchers have found that where ACs consist of independent members there is 
an increase in AC effectiveness and overall corporate governance.  For example, better 
monitoring occurred in organisations (Klein 2002a, Klein 2002b, Carcello and Neal 2000), 
more AC meetings were held (Abbott and Parker 2000) and there was an increase in the 
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financial expertise of members and overall audit quality (De Zoort, Hermanson, 
Archambeault and Reed 2002, Carcello and Neal 2003, Chen, Moroney and Houghton 2005), 
when AC members were more independent. 
 
Table II provides a detailed comparison of AC member independence in Australia over the 
first two periods of regulation. For period 1, we analysed the data provided by Simnett, Green 
and Roebuck (1993) and found that only 25 companies in 1988 disclosed that they had an AC. 
 Of these, 18 (72%) disclosed that their AC consisted entirely of non-executive directors, 
while 22 (88%) had a majority of non-executive directors on their AC.  Simnett, Green and 
Roebuck (1993) also provided data for 1990 and after analysis we found that 36 companies 
disclosed they had an AC, 21 (58%) of those ACs consisted entirely of non-executive 
directors, while 30 (83%) consisted of a majority of non-executive directors.  Buckby (1994) 
reports that 40 companies (56%) had ACs at the end of this period that consisted entirely of 
non-executive directors, with 69 companies (97%) disclosing their ACs consisted of a 
majority of independent directors. 
 
These results are mixed with an overall decline in the percentage of ACs with entirely 
independent members, but an increase in the percentage of ACs consisting of a majority of 
independent members. One explanation for the decline in the percentage of ACs with all 
members being independent is that the disclosures by companies may not have been 
completely accurate, given that disclosures were voluntary.  Another explanation is that the 
definition of what independence actually meant was still evolving and had only been broadly 
defined at this point. A third reason for the change in independence is the introduction of the 
requirement in ASX listing rule 4.10 which requires that an AC must consist of at least 3 
members all of whom are non-executive directors. 
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In the second period of regulation, the results of Psaros and Seamer (2004) provide a clearer 
indication of the percentage of ACs with truly independent members, as their results are based 
on a more refined definition of independence.  To be independent AC members must be non-
executive directors and have no other affiliations with the company, e.g. business 
relationships, (Pasaros and Seamer 2004:81).   This contrasts with period 1, where it was 
frequently accepted that being non-executive was synonymous with independence. Directors 
can be non-executive and not be independent.  These directors are known as ‘grey directors’.  
Psaros and Seamer (2004) report that 90 (38%) of ASX listed companies in 1998 had ACs 
consisting of entirely independent members, while 149 (63%) had ACs consisting of a 
majority of independent directors.  In their 2001 results, Paros and Seamer (2004) found a 
decline in independence with 66 (28%) of companies having ACs consisting entirely of 
independent directors and 145 companies (61%) having ACs consisting of a majority of 
independent directors.  In summary, 173 (72%) of companies in 2001 did not meet best 
practice recommendations at the time with respect to the appointment of ‘truly’ independent 
directors to their ACs (Paros and Seamer 2004). 
Insert Table II here 
 
 
3.4 Audit Committee Member Financial Expertise and Knowledge 
 
Many writers consider that it is important for all AC members to have business and industry 
experience relevant to the organisation and for some of the members to have a financial and 
accounting background to assist the committee to understand and report on financial information 
of the organisation (Purtill 1988, McQueen 1991, Coopers and Lybrand 1990, Ernst and Young 
1991, Cook 1993). The BRC (1999) report recommended that ACs should have at least three 
members who are financially literate and at least one of the AC members should have past 
accounting or financial expertise. 
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Prior studies have shown that financial knowledge (i.e. the ability to read and understand 
financial statements) is critical for AC members to perform their duties well and leads to 
increased AC effectiveness (Buckby 1994, Krishnamoorthy, Wright and Cohen 2002, De 
Zoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed 2002). In addition, AC members with audit 
and/or accounting knowledge are more likely to support the external auditors when conflicts 
occur with management over audit opinions (DeZoort and Salterio 2001) and are more likely 
to have a complementary impact on AC relations with internal audit (Goodwin 2003).  
 
The Australian empirical evidence of AC member financial expertise and knowledge during 
the first two periods of regulation is limited and therefore has not been incorporated into a 
table.  In period 1, Arthur Andersen (1992) found that 78% of non-executive director 
members of ACs, had accounting experience and 16% had commerce experience. Buckby 
(1994) reports that 46% of AC chairpersons and 14.1% of other AC members had accounting 
and auditing experience.  These results indicate that AC members were relatively lacking in 
financial expertise during the first period of regulation.   
 
During the second period of regulation Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found that 29% of 
AC members had financial expertise, such as an accounting degree or a professional 
accounting qualification. 
 
Although we acknowledge the samples in these three studies are not comparable, there is 
evidence that companies were increasingly appointing AC members with financial expertise 
during these two time periods.  
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3.5 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
 
The frequency of audit committee meetings appears to be an important component 
contributing to audit committee effectiveness which signals diligence on behalf of the AC (De 
Zoort, Hermanson, Archambeault and Reed 2002; Gendron and Bedard 2006).  Several 
studies have included the frequency of AC meetings as a proxy for diligence (Abbott, Parker, 
Peters and Raghunandan 2003, Abbott, Parker and Peters 2004, Song and Windram 2004).  
Abbott, Parker, Peters and Raghunandan (2003), found that an audit committee that meets at 
least four times annually was not associated with higher external audit fees.  In contrast 
Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006), found that ACs that meet more frequently are associated 
with higher audit fees.  Abbott, Parker and Peters (2004), report that audit committees that 
meet more frequently are negatively associated with the occurrence of financial misstatement. 
 Stewart and Munro (2007), found that the frequency of audit committee meetings and the 
auditor’s attendance at meetings are significantly associated with a reduction in perceived 
audit risk. These findings suggest that when ACs meet more frequently other positive benefits 
flow.  
 
Table III provides empirical evidence of the frequency of AC meetings for period 1 and 2.  
We acknowledge that the four samples are not comparable however, the two samples in 
Psaros and Seamer (2004) are comparable, and show that 47% of ACs met four times or more 
in 1998 and 45% met four times or more in 2001.  
 
Although this result shows a slight decline, overall the results indicate that the trend for ACs 
to meet four times or more annually has been steadily increasing from 11% in 1992 (Arthur 
Andersen 1992) to  22% in 1994 (Buckby 1994), and then to 45.2% in 2001 (Psaros and 
Seamer 2004).  Again there is evidence that companies are increasing the number of times 
their AC meets annually. 
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Insert Table III here 
 
 
3.6  Summary 
 
It is evident from the prior empirical literature that Australian ASX listed companies have 
formed ACs, either voluntarily or because of mandated regulation.  The increase is 
particularly evident at the commencement of period 2, where formation was still voluntary 
and period 3, where it became mandatory.  It is interesting to note that in period 2 the rate of 
AC formation ranged between 76.6% (Goodwin-Stewart and Kent 2006) and 95.6% (Psaros 
and Seamer 2004), which is high for a voluntary period. Although it was evident that AC 
formation would become mandatory  (Commonwealth of Australia 2002), for the top ASX 
listed companies, these results suggest the majority of companies were willing to establish 
ACs in advance of the regulations,  thereby ‘signalling’ to the market their commitment to 
improving corporate governance structures and processes. 
 
The remaining results for period 1 and 2 are mixed.  There was an increase in the number of 
AC members with financial expertise and an increase in the number of times ACs met 
annually. Again, suggesting that companies were willing to improve their corporate 
governance processes and disclose favourable information to the market in their annual 
company returns to the ASX (period 1) and annual reports (period 2).  However, the trend 
with respect to the independence of AC members’ was contrary to the other results.    As 
previously discussed we propose this was due to the lack of a narrow definition of 
‘independence’ which meant ‘grey directors’ were reported as ‘independent directors’.    
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4. Corporate Governance Reforms from 1 July 2003 
 
The prior discussion and empirical evidence presented on the formation, composition and 
meeting frequency of ACs relate primarily to the first two periods of AC regulation in 
Australia. 
 
Further, recent regulation has emphasized the importance of the AC.  Recommendation 4.1 of 
the ASX CGC (2007) best practice recommendations states that the board should establish an 
AC.  In addition recommendation 4.2 states that the AC is structured to consist of: (1) only 
non-executive directors; (2) a majority of independent directors; (3) is chaired by an 
independent chair who is not chair of the board and (4) at least three members.  Transitional 
arrangements applied until 1 July 2005 which permitted ACs to comprise of a majority of 
non-executive directors, with at least one member being independent.  The names and 
qualifications of the AC members are to be disclosed (in the corporate governance section of 
the annual report), along with the number of meetings held by the AC annually (ASX CGC 
2007:27). 
 
It is important to note that the transitional arrangements allow one additional year for 
companies to introduce more outside directors onto their audit committees.  All other 
provisions and recommendations introduced on 1 July 2003 are applicable to ACs at 30 June 
2004. We believe it is important to report compliance for our sample companies on both the 
transitional and ongoing provisions and recommendations. Specific issues reported are: (1) 
level of AC formation; (2) number of AC members; (3) AC member independence (separated 
into non-executive and independent); (4) financial expertise of AC members; and (5) the 
frequency of AC meetings.  
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4.1 Sample Selection and Results 
 
The initial sample for this study consists of corporate governance data collected on all 
Australian publicly listed companies with a financial year end of 30 June 2004, included in 
the Aspect Data Analysis Database (1000 companies). This data was compared to the ASX 
list of the Top 300 companies in the All Ordinaries Index for the 2004 financial year.  The 
final sample consisted of 188 companies with a year end of June 30, 2004.  The results of this 
study are shown in Table IV Panel A through to Panel E. 
Insert Table IV here 
 
4.2.1 Audit Committee Formation 
 
The results reported in Table IV, Panel A show that 99% (186 out of 188) companies disclosed 
the existence of an AC in their annual report for the year 2004.  This is almost 100% compliance 
with ASX Listing rule 12.7 and best practice recommendation 4.1. The regulations require an 
entity in the top 300 ASX listed companies to have an AC by the end of the 2004 financial year. 
Only two companies in our sample did not comply and gave no explanation for non-compliance. 
This result provides strong support that the mandatory requirement to establish an AC for the top 
300 ASX listed companies in Australia is being complied with. 
 
4.2.2 Number of Audit Committee Members 
 
The ASX CGC guidelines require ACs to have: at least three members, (ASX CGC 2007). The 
results on the number of AC members are shown in Table IV, Panel B.  Of the 188 companies 
examined, three companies (2%) did not disclose the number of AC members.  Fifteen 
companies (8%) had ACs comprising of two members only and 170 companies (90%) had three 
members or more.  Therefore, 90% of the companies in our sample complied by having at least 
three members on their AC and 10% of companies did not complyviii with best practice 
                     
viii  For the purposes of this study, where companies have not disclosed the required or recommended information, this has been taken as an 
indication of non-compliance, due to non-disclosure. 
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recommendation 4.2.  The average number of members was 3.3, with a range of between 2 to 6 
members. 
 
These results are interesting and when compared to prior research indicate an obvious decline 
in the range of number of AC members.  When ACs were initially established they consisted 
of both executive and non-executive directors and this appears to have resulted in the 
committee being larger in period 1. In addition in the first two periods no guidelines were  
promulgated on ‘ideal’ AC size.   AC regulation and best practice recommendations advocate 
that ACs have at least three members and be formed of a majority of non-executive directors. 
Consequently, the number of AC members has reduced as executives have been removed 
from the committee structure. 
 
4.2.3 Audit Committee Member Independence 
ASX CGC (2007) recommendation 4.2 states that ACs should consist of only non-executive 
directors. 175 (93%) companies disclosed this information, as shown in Table 4, Panel C.  All of 
these companies had a majority of non-executive directors on their AC, with 149 (79%) having 
an AC comprising only of non-executive directors.  Therefore, all disclosing companies complied 
with recommendation 4.2 under the transitional arrangements which permit a majority of non-
executive directors on the AC.  The number of companies (excluding non-disclosures) having 
one or two executives on the AC totalled 26 (14%) however, these companies still had a majority 
of non-executive directors.  Overall, the level of compliance with this recommendation was 93%, 
with only 13 (7%), the non-disclosing companies, not complying.   These results indicate a solid 
improvement in the proportion of non-executives on ACs when compared to period 2.  
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The recommendations (ASX CGC 2007) also call for ACs to have a majority of independent 
directors as members.  These are non-executive directors, who have no other association with 
management except for their role on the AC.  Of the 175 disclosing companies, 31 (16%) had a 
majority of independent members, with 37 (19%) having at least one independent director.  
Therefore, from our sample only 31 companies had voluntarily adopted best practice 
guideline 4.2, by structuring their AC to consist of a majority of independent directors.  Under 
the transitional arrangements, effective until 30 June 2004, an AC may have a majority of 
non-executive directors on the AC, with at least one member being an independent director. 
In our sample all disclosing companies had a majority of non-executive directors, but only 68 
(36%) had at least 1 independent director.  Therefore, 120 (64%) of companies (including the 
non-disclosures) did not comply with the transitional arrangements of appointing at least 1 
independent director as a member of their AC. 
 
This unsatisfactory level of compliance with respect to independent directors serving on ACs 
may be related to a lack of full disclosure in the company’s annual report. Some companies 
may be reporting their members as being non-executive who are independent as well, but are 
not specifically disclosing this. This study assumes that (unless otherwise specified) non-
executive directors are not independent.  Alternatively this level of compliance may be 
accurate.  Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2006) found from a sample of 401 ASX listed 
companies in 2000 that the mean percentage of truly independent AC members was 46%, but 
that the mean percentage of non-executive AC members was 63% (Goodwin-Stewart and 
Kent 2006:394).   
 
It has been a fairly contentious issue as to just how many AC members should be truly 
independent directors when other skills such as knowledge of the companies core business is 
considered extremely important in understanding the financial reports, internal control 
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processes and in fulfilling other duties that are required of AC members.  Although this 
argument is still being debated the issue of interpreting the definition of ‘independent’ has to 
some extent been addressed, with the release of the revised ASX corporate governance 
principles document on 2 August 2007.  This document provides a list of relationships 
affecting independent status which companies can take into account when determining 
whether a director is independent or not, rather than referring to a definition of independence 
(ASX CGC 2007:10).  We anticipate that this will lead to increased compliance with this 
recommendation in the future and alleviate the confusion over the interpretation of ‘non-
executive director’, ‘grey director’ and ‘independent director’. 
 
4.2.4 Audit Committee Member Financial Expertise 
 
ASX CGC (2007) recommendations do not specifically require AC members to have financial 
expertise, but companies are required to disclose the qualifications of AC members.  Using 
the same financial expertise criteria as Kent and Stewart (2006),ix our results range from 25 
(13%) of ACs having no members with financial expertise, to 4 (2%) of ACs having 4 
members with expertise. What is important is that 137 (73%) of ACs had at least one member 
with accounting or financial expertise.  This result provides strong support for the BRC 
(1999) which recommended, and SOX (2002) which mandates, that all ACs should have at 
least one member with accounting or finance expertise. The number of non-disclosures and 
therefore non-compliers of this information was fairly high at 26 (14%) of companies.x   
 
4.2.5 Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
 
The number of AC meetings per year in our sample ranged from 1-10 with a mean of 4.25 per 
year.  In addition, 61.5% of ACs met 4 times or more annually, with 31.5% meeting 3 times 
                     
ix  An accounting or finance qualification was identified for each member of the AC disclosed in the annual reports, e.g. B.Com, CA, FCA, 
CPA. 
x  For the purposes of this study, where companies have not disclosed the required or recommended information, this has been taken as an 
indication of non-compliance, due to non-disclosure. 
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or less and 7% (12) companies did not disclose this information.  This result indicates that 
companies are moving towards holding 4 meetings per year. There is a considerable increase 
in the number of ACs who meet 4 times or more annually since period 2 of the regulation 
where Psaros & Seamer (2004) report (45.2%). Although the number of AC meetings per year 
is not stipulated under the ASX CGC (2007) recommendations, companies are required to 
disclose how many meetings have been held and clearly the 29 (15.5%) of companies holding 
1 or 2 meetings per year would not be considered to be operating in the spirit of best practice 
recommendations.  Several reports have indicated that for an AC to be effective it should 
meet at least 3 times annually (BRC 1999, NACD 1999, Smith Report 2003).  In addition, 
Stewart and Munro (2007) found that external auditors thought four AC meetings annually 
was appropriate.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
During the three periods of regulation identified between 1976 and 2004, there has been a 
concerted effort by the accounting profession, regulatory authorities, politicians, shareholder 
groups and others, to strengthen corporate governance principles and practices in relation to 
the establishment, composition, operation and responsibility of ACs in Australia.  This paper 
presents a summary of empirical evidence over the three key periods of regulation identified 
and in particular adds to the body of research in this area by providing new empirical 
evidence for the first year of the latest regulatory period.   
 
The findings indicate that compliance with corporate governance regulation and best practice 
recommendations has improved substantially for the top 300 ASX listed companies in the 
areas of AC formation, the number of AC members, non-executive directors serving on the 
AC, the financial expertise of AC members and the frequency of meetings.  However, on the 
issue of AC member independence compliance is well below what is recommended in the 
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best practice guidelines. Companies appear reluctant to appoint independent directors to their 
ACs. Overall our findings suggest that listed companies are realizing the importance of 
forming ACs and making increased corporate governance disclosures in their annual reports 
to improve the integrity of their financial reporting.  This is turn, potentially enhances and 
restores shareholder confidence in the financial reporting processes.  
 
Further research is recommended to better understand the optimal combination of 
‘independent’ and ‘non-executive’ directors serving on ACs, in order to comply with best 
practice recommendations and provide diligent service to the organization.  Future research 
should also be conducted using later annual report data which will provide subsequent 
evidence of compliance with ASX ruling 12.7 and ASX CGC recommendations following the 
transitional provisions (ASX 2006, ASX CGC 2007). 
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Table I – Audit Committee Formation in Australia–Comparison across Three Periods of Regulation  
Researchers/Year of 
publication 
Year of 
study 
Respondents Data 
Collection 
Method 
Audit committee  
Existence 
% 
Period 1 - Voluntary AC & Non Disclosure Period 
Christofi (1978) 1977 33 large listed public companies Survey 25.0 
Davison (1984) 1982 200 large listed companies –Sydney  Stock 
Exchange 
Survey 27.0 
Simnett, Green & 
Roebuck (1993) 
1988 279 companies from Top 500 ASX listed 
companies 
Annual report 
disclosure 
9.3 
Simnett, Green & 
Roebuck (1993) 
1990 249 companies from Top 500 ASX listed 
companies 
Annual report 
disclosure 
13.3 
Ernst & Young (1991) 1990 56 large listed companies Survey 66.0 
Buckby,Dunstan & Logan 
(1993) 
1991 85 large listed companies Survey 76.0 
Arthur Andersen (1992) 1992 227 listed companies (Sample – all ASX 
listed companies) 
Survey 48.0 
Korn Ferry (1993) 1992 175 large companies (Sample – top 300 
ASX listed companies) 
Survey 87.0 
Baxter & Pragasam 
(1999) 
1992 215 randomly selected from all ASX listed 
companies 
Annual Report 
Disclosure 
38.6 
Kerwick (1993) 1993 192 large companies  Survey 80.0 
Korn Ferry (1994) 1993 185 large companies (Sample top 300 ASX 
listed companies) 
Survey 91.0 
Buckby (1994) 1993 293 ASX listed companies (Sample -top 
500 ASX Listed companies)   
Annual Return 
Data 
58.8 
Period 2 - Voluntary AC & Public Disclosure Period 
Moroney & Simnett 
(1996) 
1994 220 Listed companies (Sample Top 500 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
88.6 
Carson (2002) 1996 361 Listed companies (Sample Top 500 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
84.0 
Ramsay & Hoad (1997) 1996 268 Listed companies (68 – Top 100ASX 
listed companies and 100 – Top 100-500 
ASX listed companies  and 100 Top 501> 
ASX listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
100.0 (Top 100) 
95.0 (Top 101-
500) 
Psaros & Seamer (2004) 1998 238 Listed companies (Sample Top 250 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
95.2 
Chen, Moroney & 
Houghton (2005) 
2000 458 Listed companies (Sample Top 510 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
88.0 
Davidson, Goodwin-
Stewart  & Kent (2005)  
2000    434 ASX Listed companies (Sample 568 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
Disclosures 83.0 
Goodwin-Stewart & Kent 
(2006) 
2000 406 Listed companies (Sample 1400 ASX 
Listed companies) 
Survey and 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
76.6 
Psaros & Seamer (2004) 2001 239 Listed companies (Sample Top 250 
ASX Listed companies) 
Annual Report 
disclosure 
95.6 
Period 3 - Mandatory AC & Public Disclosure Period 
  
29 
Korn Ferry & Egan 
(2003) 
2003 447 out of 494 Australian Listed companies Annual report 
disclosures 
90.0 
KPMG (2005) 2003 
2004 
55 Entities – 37 in Top 50 S&P All 
Ordinaries index, 18 in 51-500 ASX listed 
companies 
Survey 100.0 
100.0 
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Table II Audit Committee Member Independence - Period 1 and 2 
 Period 1 
Voluntary AC Formation & Non Disclosure Period * 
 
Period 2 
Voluntary AC Formation & Public 
Disclosure Period 
 Simnett, 
Green & 
Roebuck 
(1993) 
Simnett, Green 
& Roebuck 
(1993) 
Buckby (1994) Psaros & Seamer 
(2004) 
Psaros & Seamer 
(2004) 
Year of Study 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001 
 Numbe
r 
% Number % Number % Number % Number % 
All Members are 
independent 
18 72 20 59 40 56 90 38 66 28 
Majority of 
Members are 
independent 
4 16 8 23 29 41 59 25 79 33 
50% or more of 
members are not 
independent 
3 12 6 18 2 3 72 30 72 30 
100% of 
members are not 
independent 
0 0 0 0 0 0 17 7 22 9 
Non Disclosures           
TOTAL 25 100 34 100 71 100 238 100 239 100 
 
* Independence in this period was generally defined by AC members being non-executive.
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Table III - Annual Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings - Period 1 & 2 
 Period 1 Period 1 Period 2 Period 2 
 Voluntary AC 
Formation & No 
Public Disclosure 
Period 
Voluntary AC 
Formation & No 
Public Disclosure 
Period 
Voluntary AC 
Formation & Public 
Disclosure Period 
Voluntary AC 
Formation and Public 
Disclosure Period 
 Arthur Andersen 
(1992) 
Buckby (1994) Psaros & Seamer 
(2004) 
Psaros & Seamer 
(2004) 
Year of Study 1992 1994 1998 2001 
 Number % Number % Number  % Number % 
Committee met 
less than four 
times 
77 89 55 78 120 53 131 55 
Committee met 
four times or 
more 
9 11 16 22 108 47 108 45 
Total 86 100 71 100 228 100 239 100 
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Table IV – Audit Committee Characteristics – Period 3 Results (2004) 
Period 3 - Mandatory AC Formation and Public Disclosure Period 
Panel A – Audit Committee Existence 
 Number of Companies Percentage of  companies 
Existence of Audit Committee  186 99 
No Audit Committee 2 1 
Total  188 100% 
Panel B – Number of Members on the Audit Committee 
 Number of Companies Percentage of Companies 
2 members 15 8 
3 members 111 59 
4 members 47 25 
5 members 8 4 
6 members 4 2 
Non-disclosures 3 2 
Total 188 100% 
Mean No. of members 3.3 
Panel C- Audit Committee Member Independence 
 Number of Companies Percentage of Companies 
All Members are non-executive  149 79 
Majority of Members are non-executive  26 14 
Non Disclosures 13 7 
Total  188 100% 
   
Majority of Members are independent 31 17 
At least one member is independent 37 19 
No independent members 107 57 
Non Disclosures 13 7 
Total 188 100% 
Panel D- Audit Committee Member Financial Expertise & Knowledge 
 Number of Companies Percentage of Companies 
AC with 0 members having expertise 25 13 
AC with 1 member having expertise 41 22 
AC with 2 members having expertise 66 35 
AC with 3 members having expertise 26 14 
AC with 4 members having expertise 4 2 
Non Disclosures 26 14 
Total 188 100% 
Panel E -  Annual Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
 Number of Companies Percentage of Companies 
1 Meeting 1 0.5 
2 Meetings 28 15 
3 Meetings 30 16 
4 Meetings 51 27 
5 Meetings 31 16 
6 Meetings 16 9 
7 Meetings 10 5 
8 Meetings 6 3 
9 Meetings 2 1 
10 Meetings 1 0.5 
Non Disclosures 12 7 
Total 188 100% 
Range of Meeting Frequency 1-10 meetings, Mean No. of Meetings 4.25 
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1976
State Corporate Affairs Commissioners urge accounting 
profession and company directors to establish ACs (Davison, 
1984). 
1989
Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (1989) 
recommends that ACs should be mandated in its enquiry into the Social and 
Fiduciary Duties and Responsibilities of Company Directors  
1991
House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs 
(1991) considered that AC’s should be required for all listed Australian companies.  
Henry Bosch (1991) and his committee (HBC) supports AC formation in the first 
edition of the “Corporate Practices and Conduct Paper (CP&CP)” (Business Council of 
Australia,  1991). 
1. The Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Securities 
(PJC) reported on its consideration of “The role of Audit Committees 
in Corporate Governance” and identified a number of positive benefits 
of public companies having ACs  (PJC, 1993).  
2. ASX issued a discussion paper indicating commitment to 
encouraging listed companies to establish ACs consisting of a majority 
of non-executive directors (ASX, 1992).   
1992
1993
Period 1 -Voluntary AC Formation & Non Disclosure
Period 
1. The HBC released 2nd Edition. of the “CP&CP” which recommends that public 
company boards should appoint an AC with at least a majority of non-executive 
directors; the chairperson should be a non-executive director who is not the 
chairperson of the Board; AC membership should be disclosed in the annual report 
and the AC should have clear terms of reference (Business Council of Australia, 
1993). 
2. ASX changed ASX rulings to require disclosure of AC establishment in listed 
company's half yearly and preliminary Annual Returns to the exchange [ASX Ruling 
3B (1) & (2)] (ASX, 1993).  
3. Big-Six chartered accounting firms released guides to AC formation and 
operation to assist the increasing number of clients companies in the process of 
AC establishment.  Many of these guides contained messages of support for 
mandatory AC establishment. 
July 1 – ASX introduces listing Rule 3C-3(i) requiring ASX listed companies to include 
as a “separate item in their annual report” – a statement whether or not, as at the 
date of the directors’ report, the company had an AC of the board of directors and, 
if it did not, a statement explaining why it did not’ (ASX, 1993). 
Period 2 -Voluntary AC Formation & Public 
Disclosure Period
November- the HBC issue an updated guide on Corporate Practice 
and Conduct which furthers supports the call for mandatory ACs with 
a majority of non-executive directors (Business Council of Australia, 
1995). 1995
July 1 - ASX Listing rule 4.10 replaced ASX ruling 3C. The first requirement of 
this new Rule - 4.10.2 continued the requirements of Listing rule 3C-3(i) i.e. 
whether the company had an audit committee and if not, why not.  The second 
requirement of ASX listing rule 4.10 - part 3 requires listed companies to include 
in their annual report “a statement of the main corporate governance practices 
that the entity had in place during the reporting period.  If a practice had been in 
place for only part of the period, the entity must state the period during which it 
had been in place”. This replaced Listing rule 3C-3(j) (ASX, 2001).   
CLERP Law reforms are commenced which impact on ACs 
(McConville, 2004) 
1997
The Ramsay Report in 2001 indicated that ACs should be compulsory for all listed 
companies in Australia (Ramsay, 2001).   2001 
1. August- the ASX CGC formed with the aim of developing a 
corporate governance framework for listed companies (ASX CGC 
2003). 
2. The joint committee on Public Accounts and Audit 
recommended AC’s be comprised of only non-executive directors 
(PJC PAA, 2002). 
3. CLERP 9 Discussion Paper on corporate governance reforms 
which impacts on ACs is released (Commonwealth of Australia, 
2002). 
2002
1993 
1996 
Diagram I – The Development of Audit Committee (AC) Regulation in Australia 
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1. January 1 - ASX ruling 4.10 was amended and became ASX Listing rule 
12.7 which requires ‘An entity which was included in the S & P All Ordinaries 
Index at the beginning of its financial year to have an AC during that year.  The 
composition, operation and responsibility of the AC must comply with best 
practice recommendations.” The AC must consist of at least 3 members (all non-
executive directors), the chairperson should not be the chairperson of the board 
(ASX, 2006) 
 
2. Transitional arrangements will apply until 1 July 2005 which will permit the 
AC of companies in the S & P ASX All Ordinaries Index to comprise a majority of 
non-executive directors, with at least one member being an independent 
director.  It is preferable that the chairperson be an independent director.  
Companies which fall outside the Top 500 are not required to have an AC under 
Listing Rule 12.7 but are required to report on their practices in relation to 
section 4.3 ASX CGC guidelines under Listing Rule 4.10.3 (ASX, 2006).  
 
3. March- ASX CGC Principles of Good Corporate Governance (10) and Best 
Practice recommendations (28) are released.  Principle 4.2 the Board should 
establish an AC,  Principle 4.3 the AC should be structured so that it consists of 
only non-executive directors, a majority of which are independent directors, an 
independent chairperson, who is not chairperson of the Board and the AC 
should have at least 3 members (ASX CGC, 2003). 
2003 
1.  ASX Implementation Review Group support the compliance (or 
explain why) regime of the ASX CGC Best Practice 
Recommendations (Allens Arthur Robinson, 2007). 
 
2.  ASX CGC amends ASX Listing Rule 12.7 so that composition, 
operation and responsibility apply to only top 300 listed companies 
(Allens Arthur Robinson, 2007)  
 
3. July 1 Final version of the CLERP bill became law and is known 
as the Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform & 
Corporate Disclosure) Act 2004.  Act enables amendments to the 
Corporations Act 2001 and the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission Act 2001 (Commonwealth of Australia 
2004) 
2004 
Period 3 - Mandatory AC Formation & Public 
Disclosure Period 
August 2  ASX CGC released a revised corporate governance principles 
document.  This document was very similar to the 2003 release.  The key 
changes were the removal of best practice from the title and further guidance on 
the list of relationshisp affecting board members independence status which will 
assist boards to determine the independence of a director for AC purposes. 
(ASX CGC, 2007) 
2007 
